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Legal pragmatism focuses its attention on the content of the law -- on
delivering the best substantive decision in every litigated case. Criticism of
pragmatism shares this focus. As a result, the extensive literature does not
yet address an important dimension of pragmatism: its treatment of legal
form. Pragmatism disregards legal form almost entirely, yet it offers nothing to take form's place. In this article, I contend that examining pragmatism' s treatment of legal form is, in fact, an excellent device for understanding pragmatism.' I will show that pragmatism's indifference to legal form
* Mayer, Brown, LLP, Washington, D.C. B.S., J.D., University of Virginia;
B.C.L. Oxford University. The author thanks Judge Richard Posner, Adam Sloane, and
Eugene Volokh for their criticisms and comments.
1. Professor Summers identified the issue of pragmatism's indifference to form,
but did not develop it in detail.
Reviewing Judge Posner's THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE (1990), Summers stated that Posner "rarely addresses frontally any of the
general varieties of legal formality to be found in the law, nor does he systematically con-
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constitutes a sharp break with conventional accounts of judging. I also will
explain why pragmatism should try to justify that break, and I will identify
some central points that pragmatism should address.
This matter of legal form arises because legal pragmatists reject the
view that there are distinctively legal ways of resolving disputes. Their
attention is on policy rather than principle. They give legal questions the
answers that they see as best "all things considered," without regard to
some of the legal influences that ordinarily affect judges.2 Formal reasons
are the law's manifestation of principle. Among the most visible of these
omitted influences is legal form, especially formal reasons for decisions. A
formal reason is one that the legal system creates and that only the legal
system recognizes. For example, case law - precedent - provides reasons
that are formal in the sense that their force lies in the fact that the legal system gives them special status. That is, their force lies in their form. Because of this special status, the judge is obligated to give special force to
case law, even if the judge disagrees with its substance. The judge cannot
consider "all things" on an equal footing with each other, as a non-legal
decision-maker would. He or she must treat the case law as special. Pragmatist judges, however, see things differently. They acknowledge no obligation to give case law any force at all, and grant it force only if its substance is attractive. They grant no force to legal form.
The difference between these two views of form is fundamental.
Taken seriously, pragmatism's disregard for legal form changes the nature
of judging, the justification for judicial decisions, and the balance of power
in the legal system. That is why a review of pragmatism's relationship with
legal form is an important step in understanding pragmatism and its implications.
I.

INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS

Two competing efforts to explain adjudication run through American
legal history. One emphasizes form and principle, the other, substance and
sider the rationales for their existence. Indeed, he does not even recognize legal formality in
the law for what it is." Robert S. Summers, Judge Posner's Jurisprudence,89 MICH. L.
REv. 1302, 1306 (1991).
2.
For "all things considered," see RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND
DEMOCRACY 64 (2003) [hereinafter LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY]; see also William
A. Shutkin, Pragmatism and the Promise of Adjudication, 18 VT. L. REv. 57, 75 (1993)
(explaining that pragmatists decide cases according to "the most reasonable doctrine"). For
a short introduction to legal pragmatism, see Thomas C. Grey, FreestandingLegal Pragmatism in THE REvivAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW AND
CULTURE 254, 255-58, 268-70 (Morris Dickstein ed. 1998) [hereinafter Freestanding];see
also E.W. THOMAS, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: REALISM, PRAGMATISM, PRACTICAL REASONING

AND PRINCIPLES, 307-15 (2005).
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policy? Pragmatism is a powerful contender in this explanatory contest. It
stands squarely on the side of substance and policy, where it continues the
assault on form begun in earnest by the legal realists. Over the last two
decades, the literature of pragmatism has grown to a steady stream that
shows no sign of letting up. 5 Although it remains unclear whether pragma-6
tism is a full-blown mode of judging or merely an elaborate critique,
3.

Numerous writers have chronicled this history. Some excellent longer over-

views include NEEL DUXBURY, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995), MORTON J.
HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY (1992), and EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM &THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973). Pragmatist-oriented writers

sketch variations of this division; an example is a "divide" between "formalism" and "pragmatism" described by Thomas C. Grey in JudicialReview and Legal Pragmatism,38 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 473, 478 (2003).
4. See generally PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY (Michael Brint & William
Weaver eds., 1991); Symposium on the Renaissanceof Legal Pragmatismin American Legal
Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569 (1990). Central examples of work that reflects a pragmatist view include (in alphabetical order by author) Daniel Farber, Reinventing Brandeis:
Legal Pragmatismfor the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 165-72 (1995)
(providing an overview of pragmatism and common criticisms); Freestanding,supra note 2,
at 21; Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. L.
REV. 937, 995 (1990) (contending that law can be seen as a pragmatist discourse); Margaret
Jane Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699 (1990); Suzanna
Sherry, Hard Cases Make Good Judges, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 3 (2004) (advocating an approach to free speech that emphasizes pragmatic concerns over "grand principles"); and
Catharine Pierce Wells, Improving One's Situation: Some PragmaticReflections on the Art
of Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 323 (1992) (discussing adjudication as an "inherently
situated activity"). For one scholar's short summary of pragmatism's appeal, see Catharine
Pierce Wells, Why Pragmatism Works For Me, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 347 (2000). For Richard
Posner's book-length works discussing his pragmatist views, see THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE (1990); OVERCOMING LAW (1995); THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND
LEGAL THEORY (1999); LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY (2003). See also citations at

note 38, infra.
5.
For discussion of the "pragmatist revival," see Thomas C. Grey, What Good Is
Legal Pragmatism?, in PRAGMATISM LAW AND SOCIETY 9 (1991) [hereinafter What Good].

The stream is even larger if one includes schools that sometimes ally themselves with pragmatists, such as feminists. Margaret Jane Radin discusses this relationship in The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699 (1990). Even discounting for the use of
"pragmatic" as an uptown substitute for "practical," the volume is large. A search of law
review articles published from 1965 through 1985 turned up five titles referring to some
form of pragmatism. The same search for the years 1986 to 2005 produced 484 hits. (Westlaw search conducted Jan. 9, 2006.) Much of this difference may be due to the absence of
earlier journals from the database, but the ninety-six-fold increase illustrates the magnitude
of the increase.
6.
Pragmatism remains somewhat protean, without "well-defined theses." Steven
Walt, Some Problems of PragmaticJurisprudence, 70 TEX. L. REV. 317, 318 (1991). Indeed, the same writer contends that "[i]t is unclear what makes a theory pragmatic." Id. at
317-18. Even pragmatism's most prominent champion, Judge Richard Posner, concedes that
pragmatism remains "spongy." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND
LEGAL THEORY, 240 (1999) [hereinafter PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY].
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pragmatism needs to justify its sharp demotion of legal form.7 This requires
pragmatism to develop a response
to the extensive literature that examines
8
the functions of legal form.
In this article, I work through the implications of pragmatism's treatment of legal form. I begin by reviewing some of the functions served by
legal form, with a focus on the role of formal reasons for decisions. I then
sketch an overview of pragmatist judging. This overview draws on some
stock criticisms of pragmatism, but emphasizes pragmatism's disregard of
form; this emphasis provides a basis for a review of some of pragmatism's
central features. To that end, I work through several points of comparison
between pragmatism and conventional judging. 9 This exercise generates a
list of topics that pragmatists should address to justify their treatment of
form and, more broadly, their proposed departure from conventional judging. I identify the primary concerns raised by each point of comparison but
do not fully develop each point, something that would require far more extensive discussion. Throughout this discussion, I use the example of an
influential opinion by Judge Posner, who doubles as pragmatism's most
prominent champion and a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. I identify elements of this decision that are distinctively pragmatist, then review the consequences of that pragmatism.
This discussion leads to several related conclusions. They are connected in several ways; but the most conspicuous thread that runs through
them is a rejection of the judge's obligation to give force to formal reasons.
The first conclusion relates to the central point of pragmatism: its promise
of improved legal reasoning. Pragmatism promises to reduce or eliminate
the bluntness of form-oriented reasoning. I conclude, however, that pragmatism does significantly less in this regard than most writers assume. I
conclude that pragmatist judges, freed from the constraints of legal form,
Critics can be harsher, tagging pragmatists' work as "slippery and evasive." Jeremy Waldron, Ego-Bloated Hovel, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 597, 600 (2000). I try to resolve some of this
ambiguity by identifying core features of pragmatism that are common to various pragmatist
writers and that hang together as an identifiable and distinct approach to adjudication.
7.
Some scholars who find significant insights in pragmatism consider it no more
than a critique. See, e.g., What Good, supra note 5, at 9 ("The main job of pragmatist theory
is critique of more ambitious (nonpragmatist) theories.").
8.
For example, P.S. Atiyah & Robert S. Summers, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY,
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 2 (1987), provide an overview and detailed treatment of legal

form. Also, for an extensive analysis of various properties of legal form see JOSEPH RAZ,
THE AUTHORrY OF LAW (1990) [hereinafter, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW], and FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991) [hereinafter PLAYING BY THE RULES].
9.

For a helpful introduction to delineating and describing subject matter by identi-

fying practical point and focal meaning, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 3-22 (1980).
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continue to employ generalizations much like those that are reflected in
legal forms. One apparent explanation for this continued use of generalizations is the existence of practical limits on the ability of judges to find facts
and engage in complex reasoning. Another explanation is the tendency of
judges, when essentially freed from concrete precedents, to reason from
abstractions.
This conclusion - that the benefits of pragmatism are less than the literature assumes - makes the costs of pragmatism loom larger. These costs
result, in one way or another, from pragmatism's unwillingness to take any
considerations off the judicial table. I conclude that these costs are more
substantial than the literature recognizes. The first cost is an increase in
true judicial errors, the result of the increased complexity of pragmatist
decisions. This cuts against pragmatism's goal of getting more cases just
right. It also decreases predictability.
Second, decision costs increase substantially. This increase does not
merely require more resources; it also cuts against pragmatism's substantive goals of increased contextuality. It helps explain the tendency of
judges to continue to employ generalizations, even when freed from the
constraints of legal form.
The third cost is diminished predictability. I conclude that pragmatism
cannot maintain a workable level of predictability as long as it rejects the
view that judges have an obligation to give force to formal reasons. Without that obligation, there is no ex ante basis to predict what a court will do.
Predictability also is reduced by the increase in true judicial errors.
The fourth cost is the loss of the traditional basis for the authority of
judicial decisions. Pragmatism severs adjudication's normative connection
with existing law, thus severing adjudication's traditional connection with
legitimacy. At the same time, it effects a considerable reallocation of
power in favor of the courts. Pragmatism needs a theory that legitimizes
these changes.

[Vol. 28
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SOME TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN PRAGMATIST AND PRINCIPLED REASONING

Form/principle
Contextuality/getting the
right answer, all things
considered

Accepts imperfect
decisions in some
cases

Pragmatism/policy
Inclines toward allthings- considered reasoning that is more
sensitive to context
This is where pragmatists see the benefits of
pragmatist reasoning in
the form of substantively better decisions.

True judicial errors

Generally lower rate
than under pragmatist reasoning. These
occur primarily in
cases where application of the language
of the rule does not
advance the rule's
underlying purpose.
The risk of empirical
error also is present

Generally higher rate
because of greater
complexity and the
need for more facts
(higher error rate)

Decision costs

Generally better (less
expensive)

Generally weaker
(more expensive)

Continuity and Predictability

Generally better
(higher)

Generally weaker
(lower)
Pragmatists consider
predictability in what
they consider appropriate contexts, but I question whether that is
conceptually possible
in the absence of regard
for legal form
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Justification of the judicial role

11.
A.

Form/principle

Pragmatism/policy

Generally easier (because it rests more
easily on one or
more of various conventional justifications for adjudication)

Generally more difficult (because it is not
addressed by conventional justifications and
on conventional theory
of allocation of power
among branches)

LEGAL PRAGMATISM'S TREATMENT OF LEGAL FORM

SOME FUNCTIONS OF LEGAL FORM

In this article, I discuss legal form to the extent that it generates formal
reasons for judicial decisions. A formal reason is a distinctively legal reason.' ° It is created by the legal system and, therefore, is relevant only
within that system. A formal reason can be contrasted with the many reasons that are relevant to decision-makers in life outside of the legal system."
Formal reasons differ in at least three ways from reasons considered
by non-legal decision-makers: in when they have force, in the basis of their
force, and in the structure of their force vis-t-vis other reasons. First, a
formal reason has no force at all in the eyes of the non-legal decisionmaker. (It may help the non-legal decision-maker to predict what future
courts will do, but that does not constitute legal force. See the discussion in
Part II.B.4, below.)
It follows that "all-things-considered" decisionmaking, the term that pragmatists use for non-legal decision-making, is a
misnomer. It is more accurately labeled "all-things-considered-except-forformal-reasons" decision-making. For convenience, I will continue to use

10.
For a discussion of the varieties of legal formality, see ATIYAH & SUMMERS,
supra note 8, at 11-21 (identifying "authoritative formality," "content formality, "interpretive formality," and "mandatory formality"). For additional development of the varieties of
legal form, and their significance, see Robert S. Summers, How Law Is FormalAnd Why It
Matters, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1165 (1997).
11.
Professors Atiyah and Summers describe a formal reason as "a legally authoritative reason on which judges and others are empowered or required to base a decision or
action." ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 2. The formal attributes of rules include "degree of completeness of the rule, the degree to which it is definitive, the degree of its generality" and "the extent of formality of expression." Robert S. Summers, The Formal Character of Law, 51 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 242, 246 (1992). For a more extensive discussion of expressions of formality in a legal system, see ATtYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 11-21.
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the shorter name, but the "except-for-formal-reasons" qualification is significant to understanding pragmatism.
The second difference between formal and other reasons is the basis of
their force. In decision-making outside of the law, reasons have force based
on the attractiveness of their content. They are "substantive" reasons.
Formal reasons, however, have force because of their legal status, independent of the substantive outcome that they support. 12 This connects to
the third difference. Formal reasons do not compete with substantive reasons on equal terms; instead, they defeat substantive reasons by outranking
them - in almost all instances, excluding them outright. Therefore the
structure of the formal reason is "exclusionary," in the sense that it "usually
excludes from consideration, overrides, or at least diminishes the weight of,
any countervailing substantive reason."' 3 Because formal reasons help determine what reasons are relevant to the judge, as well as the relationships
among those reasons, they give legal decision-making a structure that is
different in kind from that of non-legal decision-making.
This structuring function is closely related to other functions served by
formal reasons. In particular, they allocate decision-making power. They
do this because they are generated by sources in the legal system other than
the current judge, yet the judge must respect them. They help set the scope
of the judge's power. Frederick Schauer identifies power-allocation as "the
essence of rule-based decision-making" - of decision-making structured by
legal form. 14
Indeed, formal reasons serve as the nexus between the case at hand
and the rest of the law. It is only through formal reasons that the many
elements of the legal system - such as legislative acts and earlier judicial
decisions - affect judges who decide cases, and through them affect ordinary citizens. This function depends squarely on the acknowledgement that
12.
This property of legally formal reasons sometimes is described as "contentindependence." See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Reasons for Action, Decisions and Norms, in
PRACTIcAL REASONING 128 (Joseph Raz ed. 1978) [hereinafter Reasons for Action]. For
discussions of the character of formal reasons, particularly legal rules, as having force independent of their content. See also PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 8, at 53-134.
13.
ATiYAH AND SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 2. The strongest form of this status is
captured by Joseph Raz's influential discussion of "exclusionary reasons." This is a reason
that, because of its formal status in the legal system, excludes other considerations, even if
those excluded considerations should trump the exclusionary one in an all-things-considered
decision. See Joseph Raz, PracticalReason and Norms 15-48 (1990). Some theories of
law, such as Ronald Dworkin's, assign rules the property of weight and consider their content in determining that weight, rather than assigning rules absolute priority and identifying
them based on pedigree. Even Dworkin's theory, however, assigns rules a distinctive force
because of their formal status, which he calls their "fit." See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, chs. 2-4 (1977).
14.
PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 8, at 231-32.
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the formal reasons have a claim on the judge, in the sense that the judge is
obligated to give them force based on their legal status. As will become
apparent in the following discussion, all-things-considered decisionmaking, such as legal pragmatism, cannot take formal reasons into account
unless it acknowledges this obligation.' 5 And as I explain below, pragmatism makes no such acknowledgement.
The functions of formal reasons are visible in the paradigm of legal
form: the rule. A judge applying a legal rule is obligated to give some force
to the reason that caused the rule-maker to use the device of a rule to advance a substantive purpose.' 6 Professor Schauer usefully labels these
reasons "rule-generating justifications."' 7 They include "certainty, reliance
and predictability,"' 18 as well as the now-familiar allocation of power across
the legal system.' 9 Each of these justifications has. instrumental and normative dimensions.
These justifications connect formal reasons with political legitimacy.2 °
The justifications are closely associated with the notion of the rule of law
and, therefore, with ordered liberty. 21 They tend to limit the judicial war15.
See the discussion in part III.B., infra.
16.
For a detailed account of the structure of reasoning involving formal reasons,
see Reasons for Action, supra note 12.
17.
PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 8, at 95. Atiyah and Summers refer to rulegenerating justifications as "second-level" rationales for legal formality, labeling the relevant "policy goals" the "first-level" justification for a rule, and the device of advancing those
goals through a rule the "second-level" justification, and explaining that the "'second-level'
rationales for formal legality exert justificatory force of their own." ATIYAH & SUMMERS,
supra note 8, at 23-28. Schauer labels the "policy goals" the background justification.
PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 8, at 53.
18.
PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 8, at 95. For a similar summary, see ATIYAH
& SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 23-28.
19.
Frederick Schauer describes this latter role as the assignment of jurisdiction to
different actors. PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 8, at 158-71.
20. For an introductory discussion of this connection, see THE AUTHORITY OF LAW,
supra note 8, at ch. 1. Discussing possible justifications for rules, Joseph Raz articulates the
related idea of the "service conception of authority," under which rules serve a mediating
function between actors and the reasons based on which they should act by capturing those
reasons in the form of a rule. See Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality in ETHIcs INTHE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLrcS 194 (1994); JOSEPH RAZ,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, CHS. 2-4 (1986).
21.
Of course, the meaning and significance of the "rule of law" is much-contested.
Probably the most influential discussion is Albert V. Dicey's INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1959) (referring to regularity rather than arbitrariness, to
equality before the law, and to the importance of constitutional limitations on power). For
discussions of the rule of law and the concepts it commonly includes, see THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW, supra note 8, at 210-29, FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD To SERFDOM 72-87 (1944),
and JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-43 (1971). For alternative interpretations of the
rule of law, see citations at note 52, infra. Atiyah and Summers discuss the relationship
between law's formal features and the rule of law. ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 72-
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rant, enhance citizen autonomy, and, in the view of some writers, protect
human rights.2 2
Acknowledging that formal reasons perform these functions does not
begin to entail "the vice of formalism., 23 Different theories of law differ
over the degree of form appropriate to various contexts, but some measure
of form is a fundamental element of every known legal system. Form is
what distinguishes a legal system from ad hoc problem-solving. Regard for
form distinguishes a judge, in Justice Frankfurter's famous phrase, from a
"kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency." 24 As Kathleen Sullivan has noted, it is only in "a nonlegal society [that] one might apply... background policies or principles
directly to a fact situation," without "using the intermediary of legal directives" - of legal form.25
Certain properties of formal reasons are particularly relevant to a discussion of legal pragmatism. In particular, the force of form depends on a
complex, dynamic interplay between generalization and specificity.26 For
example, legal rules are generalized statements, in the important sense that

74. For another discussion, see Doreen McBarnet and Christopher Whelan, The Elusive
Spirit of the Law: Formalismand the Strugglefor Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REV. 848, 84853, 870-73 (1991).
22.
For arguments that rights can be protected by higher levels of formalism, which
Professor Sullivan refers to in the context of constitutional law as categorization, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term: Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 59-60 (1992). For an argument that a higher level of
generality better protects certain rights, see Justice Brennan's dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23.
CAss SUNSTFi, LEGAL REASONING AND PoLmcAL CoNFLcT 24 (1996). Sunstein does not himself mistake the existence of legal form for formalism, but goes on to
describe an "honorable species of formalism." Id. In a generally pragmatist article, Catharine Pierce Wells rebuts the reflexive dismissal of formalism and the thought of Dean Langdell, with a combustible mixed metaphor, chiding that "Langdell... has served as a lightning rod for attacks against the possibility of rational foundations." Catharine Wells, SituatedDecision-making,63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727, 1729 (1990).
24.
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See
also MERLO J. PUSEY, Justice Roberts' 1937 Turnaround, in SUPREME CouRT HISTORICAL
SocIm 1983 YEARBOOK available at http://www.supremecourthistory.org/04-_ibraryl
subsvolumes/04 c20 k.html ("As Justice Felix Frankfurter often explained, a judge cannot
function as a cadi dispensing ad hoc justice under a tree.").
25.
Sullivan, supra note 22, at 57.
26.

On generalization and legal rules, see, e.g., PLAYING BY THE RuLEs, supra note

8, at 17-111; WILIAM TWINING & DAVID MIERs, How To Do THiNGS WrrH RuLs (3d ed.
1991) at 254-62, 311-15.
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they identify facts in a way that covers a range of cases.27 They can be
stated at many levels of generality, from highly general to highly specific. 8
The interplay between generality and specificity is visible not only in
rules themselves, but also where a dispute lies outside an existing rule. In
such cases, courts commonly extend an existing precedent to the new set of
facts, primarily through the use of analogy. To do this, a court identifies
features in the case at hand that are like those in a precedent. This involves
specificity because the court typically describes the two cases at a fairly
specific level - at the lowest level of generalization that permits the drawing of similarities.29 It also involves generality, because the court needs a
general principle to explain the extension to new facts. Through this process, form influences courts to extend existing law in a constrained way:
tethered both to the specific circumstances of the precedent and to a generalized principle that is discernible in the existing case law.3 °
The generalization that is inherent in legal form does lead to certain
costs. The same features that limit the power of the judge also prevent that
judge from making the best all-things-considered decision in the case at
hand. One example is the familiar phenomenon of over-inclusiveness. 1
Because of the force of legal form, the generalizations contained in a rule
operate independently of the rule's underlying purpose. In most cases, that
language advances the rule's purpose.32 Inevitably, though, in some cases

27.
PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 8, at 18. In the words of Frederick Schauer,
"[r]ules speak to types and not to particulars." Id.
28.
For an overview of the problem of identifying levels of generality at which to
formulate legal rules, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 349 (1992). See also Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CH. L. REv. 1057, 1059-65 (1990) (locating levels of generalization in constitutional interpretation based on coherence in certain localized areas of the law).
29.
For defenses of analogy as part of a practice of determinate legal reasoning, see
CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT at 42-

45 (1999) [hereinafter ONE CASE]; MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON
LAW 83-95 (1988); THE AUTHORrrY OF LAW, supra note 8, at 201-06; NEIL MACCORMICK,
LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 120-21, 155-63 (1978).
30.
For a helpful analysis of reasoning by analogy and its continuity with the application of precedent, see THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 8, at 201-09 (1986). On generating common-law rules at the point of application, see THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note
8, at 180-209, and PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 8, at 77-134.
31.
For a concise explanation of the over and under-inclusiveness of rules, see
PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 8, at 31-34, 47-52; TWINING & MIERS, supra note 26, at
260-63, 304-09.
32.
Frederick Schauer labels the rule's purpose its "background justification."
PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 8, at 53; Atiyah and Summers call it the "first-level
justification." See supra note 17. For discussion of these features of rules in terms of the
reason behind a rule and how it can diverge from the language used in stating the rule, see
TWINING & MIERS, supra note 26, at 40-44, 211-16.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 28

the rule's language applies where the rule's underlying purpose does not.3 3
An example is the famous regulation "no vehicle may be taken into a park,"
where a rule meant to exclude noisy or dangerous vehicles also, by its
terms, excludes wheelchairs and baby strollers.34 When this happens, the
effect of legal form is a decision that is wrong in the sense that it does not
advance the law's underlying purpose.35 This is a matter of imperfect fit
between the language of a rule and real life.
These wrong decisions are a cost of operating in a system with a certain level of legal formality. Conventional views of adjudication accept
these costs in some cases in exchange for the benefits of legal form in all
cases. Judicial pragmatism can be understood as an effort to avoid these
costs.
B.

PRAGMATISM'S DEMOTION OF LEGAL FORM

Pragmatists try to avoid these costs by acceding much less force to existing law, including its formal features. 36 As Judge Posner summarizes
pragmatism: "there isn't too much more to say to the would-be pragmatic
judge than make the most reasonable decision you can, all things considered. 37 Of course, numerous scholars, including Posner, say much more.38

33.
For descriptions of this phenomenon, see PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 8,
at 31-33; Robert S. Summers, The Formal Characterof Law, 51 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 242, 248
(1992) (the "rationales for legal formality ... are frequently not fully congruent with [the
substantive] policy" that underlies the rule). For a discussion of some causes of over and
under-inclusiveness and of cases in which the judge draws on the language of the rule to
infer the point of the rule, see Andrew J. Morris, PracticalReasoning and Contract as
Promise, 56 CAMBRIDGE L. J.147, 159-61 (1997).
34.
The example is from H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126 (2d ed. 1994).
35.
On second best outcomes, see PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 8, at 152-58,
and TWINING & MIERS, supra note 26, at 221-27.
36.
Accounts of pragmatism tend to be both descriptive and normative, sometimes
without distinguishing between the two approaches. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, 24-28 (1990) [hereinafter PROBLEMS]; LAW, PRAGMATISM
AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 85-86, 96.
37.
LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 64.
38.
LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 64, 85-86, 96. See also
PROBLEMS, supra note 36, at 25-26; Shutkin, supra note 2, at 57, 74-77 (providing an overview of pragmatist adjudication); Catharine Pierce Wells, Why Pragmatism Works ForMe,
supra note 4, at 356-58 (describing pragmatism's emphasis on empiricism, context and
perspective); Daniel Farber, Legal PragmatismAnd The Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1331, 1336-40 (1988) (providing a general overview of pragmatism); Daniel Farber, Reinventing Brandeis:Legal Pragmatismfor the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 163
(1995) (providing an introduction to pragmatism).
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Their work reveals a number of features that hang together as a distinctive
view of adjudication.3 9
As suggested by Posner's reference to "the most reasonable decision,"
probably the central point of pragmatism is to produce the best substantive
outcome in the specific context of each individual case. 4° In pursuit of this
best outcome, pragmatists refuse to exclude any consideration that may be
relevant. They reject legal form's central idea: that judges are obligated to
give formal reasons force because of their status, and that formal reasons
can exclude other reasons from consideration. 4 In the pragmatist view, the
"conventional materials of adjudication have no absolute priority over other
sources of information concerning the likely consequences of deciding a
case one way or another. 4 2 Pragmatists' rejection of formal reasons or
principles, therefore, extends well beyond a rejection of hard formalism. In
fact, to the committed pragmatist, "[t]here's no such thing as legal reasoning ' 43 because "the very idea that legal reasoning is a distinctive practice
capable of producing relatively determinate answers" is "mere nostalgia for
lost certitudes.""4 Because of this view, pragmatists tend to cast almost any
regard for legal form as tantamount to strong formalism: as deciding cases
based on relations among concepts with insufficient regard for the world of
fact. 45 They reject the view that judges are obliged to give "existing legal

39.
For one short summary of these features, see Shutkin, supra note 2, at 57, 7477. See also Freestanding,supra note 2, at 21, 24-29 (summarizing pragmatic adjudication).
Steven D. Smith organizes pragmatist thought into two main strands: "pragmatism as forward-looking instrumentalism, and pragmatism as a hostility to abstract theory, formalism
and foundationalism." Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L. J. 409,
411 (1990).
40.
Discussing pragmatism and contextuality, see, e.g., What Good, supra note 5, at
15; Shutkin, supra note 2, at 66-76; Wells, supra note 23, at 1729-37 (1990) (contrasting
"structured decision-making" and "contextual decision-making" and noting that every legal
decision involves elements of both).
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 2, at 139-63.
41.
42.
LAw, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 82.
43.
E.g., PROBLEMS, supra note 36, at 459; LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY,
supra note 2, at 60, 73-75. Thus, for example, Posner specifically rejects analogical reasoning, contending that it "is not actually a method of reasoning." PROBLEMS, supra note 36, at
105-08.
44.
PROBLEMS, supra note 36, at 37-38. To Posner, "[d]emonstrat[ing] that a decision is correct often is impossible." Id. at 459. Pragmatism deemphasizes traditional legal
tools and techniques. In particular, it tends to see opinions that purport to answer legal questions by applying rules as simply hiding the discretion that judges employ, for example when
they extract a rule from a set of precedents, or when they decide which facts in the record are
relevant to their decision. See id. at 46-49. On this point, pragmatism closely resembles
legal realism and its successors.
45.
LAw, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 59, 64. See also Shutkin,
supra note 2, at 66-70 (generally addressing legal form as "formalism"); Thomas, supra note
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materials" force because of their status rather than because of their substance, and that other inputs can be excluded from consideration.
46
In short, preexisting law loses its traditional authoritative status.
Pragmatists rest the authority of judicial decisions squarely on their content,
without requiring a link to another source inside the legal system. 47 Where
traditional judges "tend to value precedent as authority," the pragmatist
considers precedent relevant only to the extent it is useful.48 Precedents still
can have considerable force, for example because of the practical need for
continuity and coordination, or because they reflect the wisdom of multiple
decision-makers across time. 49 But reported cases become only one of
many inputs of equal rank. Shorn of their status as sources of formal reasons, precedents are stirred into an all-things-considered mix. 50 This is
consistent with the pragmatist view that analogy cannot usefully constrain,
or even justify, judicial decisions. 51 It also is consistent with pragmatism's
enthusiasm for empirical materials and the social sciences.52
By giving facts and consequences priority over pre-existing legal materials, pragmatism tries to shift judicial decision-making as far as possible
in the direction of particularity. Instead of valuing generalization as a necessary element of law, the pragmatist sees it as more of a vice. Pragmatism
also suggests skepticism that generalizations can, or should, constrain par2, at 54-74 (attacking the "curse" of formalism and using the example of "Timur the Barbarian").
46.
PROBLEMS, supra note 36, at 108. For Posner's strongly content-based account
of legal authority, see id. at 78-83, 90.
47.
This reasoning process is very similar to that involved in the administrative law
concept of "Skidmore deference," under which an agency's interpretation of the law "is
eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness." United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 221, 227-39 (2001). As Justice Scalia discussed in the dissent, it is hard to see
how this constitutes any deference at all. Id. at 239-41, 250-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48.
PROBLEMS, supra note 36, at 108. A result of this view of precedent is a decrease in the force of legal rights, inclining away from the traditional treatment of rights as
legal concepts having especially strong force and toward a case-by-case weighing of policy
considerations. See discussion in Farber, supra note 38, 72 MINN. L. REv. at 1342-49, 1378
(explaining the weighing of interests involved in addressing constitutional rights).
49.
See Thomas, supra note 2, at 144-51; LAw, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY,
supra note 2, at 60-61.
50.
Pragmatists consider precedents "as a testing instance: as a reason to act, rather
than as information potentially useful in deciding how to act." PROBLEMS, supra note 36, at
108.
51.
See, e.g., id. at 86-98.
52.
See, e.g., id. at 211 (stating that judges "obtain much of their knowledge of how
the world works from materials that are systematically unreliable sources of information").
Not surprisingly, pragmatism rejects legal constraints on evidence as "rigid canons of what
shall count as proof." Shutkin, supra note 2, at 77 (quotation marks and footnote omitted)
(quoting WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM, in THE WORKS OF WILLIAM JAMES 44 (Frederick H.
Burkhardt ed., Harvard University Press, 1975)).
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ticular judgments. 53 It follows that pragmatism also shows a general skepticism about conventional rule-of-law concerns.54
My reading of the pragmatist literature reveals no direct discussion of
how pragmatism, having sharply demoted legal form, purports to replace it.
To be sure, pragmatist writing sometimes refers to goals similar to those
advanced by legal form. For example, Judge Posner explains that the
pragmatist judge considers, not only the best substantive outcome in the
case at hand, but also the outcome's "systemic consequences., 55 Judge
Posner discusses these "systemic consequences ' 56 using a vocabulary traditionally associated with justifications for legal form: "simplifying inquiry,
minimizing judicial discretion, increasing the transparency of law, and
making legal obligation more definite, 57 as well as "continuity, coherence,
generality, impartiality, and predictability in the definition and administration of legal rights and duties. 5 8 Posner even refers to these considerations
as the ideas "summed up in the expression 'the rule of law.' ' 59 By including these considerations in the all-things-considered mix, Posner insists,
pragmatists give these "systemic" concerns "due regard." 6° Other writers
make similar assertions.6' Daniel Farber, for example, contends that pragmatists look backward as well as forward; that is, they fit their decisions to
precedent and to expectations.6 2 They do so, he contends, when that course
is pragmatically appropriate.63
These pragmatist considerations do not, however, begin to fill the role
conventionally filled by legal form. Pragmatists use this familiar vocabulary in a very different sense, so that it would be a semantic error to accept
these pragmatist considerations as substitutes for traditional legal form.
53.
PROBLEMS, supra note 36, at 42-60.
54.
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 2, at 150-51, 225-31. Pragmatism's skepticism
toward the traditional view of the rule of law hangs together with its skepticism toward legal
reasoning, and with its blurring of the conceptual line between legislation and adjudication.
In this way, pragmatism's view of the rule of law echoes that of the realists and their successors. See, e.g., discussion in Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought,
in THE POLmcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 35-36 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed., 1998)
(1982). In a similar vein, for a pragmatist-style attempt to recast the rule of law without
dependence on what the author casts as formalist conceptions of rules, see Margaret Jane
Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 798-807 (1989).
55.
LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 59-65.
Id. at 59-60.
56.
57.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 61.
58.
59. Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 61.
60.
61.
E.g., Shutkin, supra note 2, at 75; Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 798-800 (1989).
Farber, supra note 38, at 1344-46.
62.
63.
Id.
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(This example does, however, show why pragmatism's use of language
creates confusion and makes pragmatism hard to pin down). If pragmatism
has any claim to distinctiveness - as pragmatists insist it does - its sensitivity to "systemic concerns" serves a function entirely different from the extensive, and intricate functions conventionally performed by legal form. 64
For example, although pragmatism takes "systemic consequences"
into account to some unspecified degree, it is "[o]nly in exceptional circumstances" that pragmatism gives them "controlling weight." 65 That is why,
for example, although pragmatist judges sometimes follow precedent, they
do so only for practical reasons.6 6 Critically, pragmatist judges consider
themselves "unchecked by any felt duty to secure consistency in principle
with what other officials have done in the past., 67 And although pragmatists generally would practice "obedience to the legislature," they would do
68
so primarily because disobeying the legislature would be "destabilizing."
As Posner takes "pains to emphasize," even when a pragmatist reaches the
same result a conventional judge would reach, "the root of the decision is
still pragmatic." 69 (I question whether pragmatism has any basis for advancing settled expectations if it gives no normative force to legal form. I
argue that, without form, pragmatism's invocation of expectations is circular. See part lI.C, below.)
This rejection of a judicial obligation to give special force to existing
law distinguishes pragmatism from legal systems that give force to legal
form - even systems with low levels of formality. An example of such a
system is one inclined heavily toward standards and away from rules. Even
this low level of formality would not make the system a pragmatic one,
because the system still accepts that judges have an obligation to give special force to formal reasons.
64.
Although pragmatists assign "great social value" to the rule of law, at the same
time they warn of the risk of "blind conformity to preexisting norms." LAW, PRAGMATISM
AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 61, 94. In fact, Posner associates conventional rule-oflaw concerns with "a renunciation of all judicial flexibility, creativity and adaptivity." Id. at
61.
65.
See PROBLEMS, supra note 36.
66.
Id. at 95. 1 explain in the discussion of predictability, in part III.B.4. infra, why
pragmatism cannot follow precedent only selectively.
67.
Posner quotes this view of pragmatism from Ronald Dworkin, but says that "it
will do as a working definition of pragmatic adjudication." PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND
LEGAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 241 (quoting RONALD DwORKiN, LAW'S EMPiRE 95, 161
(1986) [hereinafter LAW'S EMPIRE]). Also rejecting a duty to secure consistency in principle, see Thomas, supra note 2, at 139-63.
68.

LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 71.

69.
Id. at 82. Similarly, Posner also writes that pragmatism "requires judges ordinarily to treat text and precedent as the most important materials of judicial decision" but
this is only because "they are the materials on which the community necessarily places its
principal reliance." Id. at 63.
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This difference highlights several distinctions between pragmatism, on
the one hand, and on the other, systems that emphasize legal standards or
guidance of similarly low formality. 7° The decision-making reasons provided by standards have normative force across cases because standards are
expressed in an authoritative form.7 ' Pragmatist reasons have no such
force. Also, standards often point toward limited sets of norms, and even
identify considerations that are tailored to specific legal locales.72 When
they do, the applying court need not look to fundamental principles to reach
a decision.73 By contrast, pragmatism leaves judges free to select new
norms, without limitation to the specific legal locale. It gives far more
freedom to start with abstraction and build upward. Finally, a standard can
evolve into a rule that carries the normative force of a formal reason. 74
Pragmatist reasoning cannot.
Pragmatism's refusal to give force to formal reasons suggests that
pragmatism cannot reject the normative force of rules, while also trying to
employ rules in selected instances. 75 Once pragmatism rejects the normative force of formal reasons, selected efforts to generate rules cannot be
effective. This is because there is no basis for judges in later cases to treat
the pragmatist statements, which may look like conventional rules, as rules.
When presented with such a pragmatist statement, the good pragmatist
judge still would review, in full, all the substantive considerations behind
the apparent rule, to see whether following that rule would lead to the most
reasonable decision. There can be, therefore, no such thing as a pragmatist
rule.
70.
For background on the usage of the words "rule" and "standard," see Pierre J.
Schlag, Rules and Standards,33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 382 n.16 (1985).
71.
For extended discussions of the continuum between rules and standards, see
Sullivan, supra note 22, and Schlag, supra note 68 passim.
72.
Even if a standard "collapse[s] decisionmaking back into direct application of
the background principle or policy to a fact situation," it has a channeling effect as long as
the "background principle or policy" reflect a limited set of norms. Sullivan, supra note 22,
at 58. And as noted above, consecutive applications of the standard have a cumulative
channeling effect.
73.
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 397-427, esp. 426-27 (1992)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (advocating consideration of multiple factors and factual context
rather than a "categorical approach" to the constitutionality of regulation of speech).
74.
It is a commonplace that permitting wider range for judicial selection of norms
sits in tension with ever-increasing pluralism.
75.
Posner suggests that "legal formalism could be a sound pragmatic strategy by
analogy to rule utilitarianism."

LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 64.

See also id. at 60 ("There are bound to be formalist pockets in a pragmatic system of adjudication, notably decision by rules rather than by standards"). Discussion of rule utilitarianism
is beyond the scope of this article, but even a strong form of rule utilitarianism would not
impose an obligation on the decisionmaker to give force to a rule independent of the rule's
content, solely because of the rule's status as a rule.
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III.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRAGMATISM'S TREATMENT OF LEGAL FORM

I now turn to the implications of pragmatism's treatment of legal form.
I will address five topics that implicate important functions served by legal
form and, therefore, provide useful points of contrast between conventional
and pragmatist judging. These are: (1) degree of generality in reasoning;
(2) incidence of judicial errors; (3) level of decision costs; (4) degree of
predictability; and (5) the allocation of power in the legal system and the
related question of judicial legitimacy. Although a rich literature discusses
each of these topics, none has received much attention in the context of
pragmatism.
A.

A SAMPLE PRAGMATIST DECISION: CENCO V. SEIDMAN & SEIDMAN

1.

The decision

I will place this discussion in a more concrete context by considering
Cenco v. Seidman and Seidman, an influential decision written by Judge
Posner in his role as judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. 76 Cenco addresses the subject of imputation. Under longestablished principles, the knowledge and conduct of an agent are imputed
to the principal. 77 As a result, the law generally holds corporations responsible for fraud conducted by their employees. 8 Imputation can render the
corporation liable to persons whom its employees defraud. It also can bar
actions by the corporation against third parties who should have helped
prevent fraud.79

686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982). Cenco, issued March 26, 1982, was one of Pos76.
ner's first opinions after he took the bench. The first opinion that he authored was Dower v.
United States, 668 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1981), issued three months earlier, on December 23,
1981.
77.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 272 (1958).

Applying the same princi-

ple, elementary corporations' law generally charges a corporation with all knowledge of its
agents. See 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLErCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §787 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 2002) ("A corporation cannot see or know

anything except by the eyes or intelligence of its officers;" its knowledge is "the imputed
knowledge of some corporate agent") (citations to cases omitted).
See FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1992). Imputation
78.
prevents a corporation from benefiting from the acts of its employees while limiting its
liability for their actions. See id. It also protects third parties who reasonably believed the
agent or employee conduct to be authorized by the principal or corporation. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282 (1958).

See Cenco, 686 F.2d at 453-54. It can enable the third parties to raise defenses
79.
including comparative negligence, lack of proximate cause, estoppel or waiver, or statutes of
limitations, as well as to bring their own claims against the corporation. For example, if the
company is charged with the knowledge and conduct of its employees, then it did not rely on
its auditor (since the company is charged with knowledge that its own financial statements
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Management conduct is not imputed to the corporation if the agent
committed the fraud while acting "adversely to the principal."8 ° This "adverse-interest" exception has great practical significance. Cases repeatedly
arise in which a corporation's managers engaged in a hidden fraud. Often
these cases involve the corporation's relationship with a third party professional, such as a law firm, an auditing firm, or an underwriter.8 1 Even if the
managers lied to the third party professionals, the third-parties can be liable
to the corporation for failing to detect the fraud if the adverse-interest exception applies so that the fraud is not imputed to the company.
As of the early 1980s, a number of courts had addressed imputation in
the context of corporate fraud and claims against third party professionals.82
The cases generally applied precedent that stated imputation principles and
the adverse-interest exception.83 This approach to imputation changed in
1982, when the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit is84
sued its opinion in Cenco v. Seidman & Seidman.
The Cenco dispute began when senior management at Cenco Incorporated fraudulently overstated the value of the company's inventory, inflating Cenco's stock price. The fraud came to light and Cenco's stock price
dropped. Cenco's new management brought claims against the company's
auditor, Seidman & Seidman for failing to detect the fraud. In its defense,
Seidman & Seidman asserted that the conduct of Cenco' s own management
should be imputed to the company, so that Cenco would be responsible for
the fraud.86
were wrong) and it is responsible for the lies that its employees told to the auditors. See id.
at 454. Therefore, imputation can give third-party professionals a defense of no reliance and
no causation. Imputation also can determine whether the auditor was entitled to rely on the
statements made by the audit client's employees. See id.
80.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282(1) (1958).
The most complete
statement of the adverse-interest exception is in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282
("Agent Acting Adversely to Principal").
81.
See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982); Falkenberg v. Baldwin, 1977 WL 1025 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1977); In re Investors' Funding Corp.
Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
82.
Examples include Falkenberg v. Baldwin, 1977 WL 1025, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June
13, 1977) (granting accountant's motion to dismiss based on imputation) and In re Investors'
Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 533, 540-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (collecting cases;

concluding that adverse-interest exception applied).
83.
In re Investors' Funding, 523 F. Supp. at 540-41; Falkenberg, 1977 WL 1025,
at *3.
84.
A Westlaw search shows that Cenco's discussion of imputation has been cited
in more than 40 opinions and a similar number of law journal articles. (Westlaw search
conducted January 5, 2007).
85.
686 F.2d at 452. Cenco asserted claims for breach of contract, professional
negligence, and fraud. Id.
86.
Id. at 453. As the Cenco court pointed out, if the management wrongdoing were
imputed to Cenco, it defeated Cenco's contract claim because of interference in the contract,
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The main issue before the Seventh Circuit was "whether [the auditor]
was entitled to use the wrongdoing of Cenco's managers as a defense"
against Cenco's claims 87 or whether, instead, the adverse-interest exception
applied. The exception would have relieved Cenco of responsibility for its
own managers.88 The court ruled that it had been permissible for the jury to
impute the managers' wrongdoing to Cenco - that is, to reject Cenco's assertion of the adverse-interest exception. 89 The court did not, however,
simply apply the adverse-interest rule. Instead, it evaluated an assortment
of empirical and normative questions, giving us a robust example of judicial
pragmatism.
2.

The court's pragmatistreasoning

The court framed the issue as follows: in "what circumstances, if any,
fraud by corporate employees is a defense in a suit by the corporation
against its auditors for failure to prevent the fraud." 90 The court then
looked for controlling authority. 91 It cited one Illinois case, which established that there was no rule categorically requiring imputation to the employer. 92 According to the Cenco court, this established that management
could avoid imputation under some circumstances. As to what those circumstances were, the court declared that "Illinois cases on auditor's liability provide no guidance." It stated that "the question has never been the
subject of a reported case" and concluded that it was writing on a "clean
slate." 93
This was an important step in writing a pragmatist decision. The court
did not disregard squarely-controlling precedent, as pragmatist scholars
suggest can be appropriate, but it achieved the same effect.94 It declared
Cenco's tort claim because of contributory negligence, and its fraud claim because of lack of
reliance. Id. at 454-55.
87.
Id. at 453-54.
88.
See id. at 454.
89.
See id. at 453-54.
Id. at 454.
90.
91.
See id. at 454-56. Away from the bench, Judge Posner has written that it is "a
legal convention" for courts to acknowledge as "correct" a "decision foursquare in accord
with a recent decision by the highest court of the jurisdiction," but this is, he contends, a
"weak convention." PROBLEMS, supra note 36, at 80.
686 F.2d at 454 (citing Cereal Byproducts v. Hall, 132 N.E.2d 27 (1956)).
92.
686 F.2d at 454. The court did not address any other imputation cases, except to
93.
distinguish one century-old English case on the ground that it involved a manager that had
stolen "from, not for the company." Id. at 454-55.
94.
Cereal Byproducts itself indicated that Illinois law would apply imputation
principles to auditors if the client were negligent. Cereal Byproducts accepted the premise
that, where the corporation was negligent, a negligent auditor could be relieved of liability.
The Southern District of New York interpreted Cereal this way. See Shapiro v. Gleckel, 380
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that the law had run out - that there was "a clean slate" - much sooner than
would have a court that wanted to give more effect to surrounding case
law.95 Certainly the parties did not think the law had run out, as they
showed by writing lengthy briefs that made extensive arguments based on
case law. 96 These briefs cited a variety of cases from Illinois and other jurisdictions, as well as the Restatement of Agency, and provided extensive
discussions of case law applying these principles to the context of audits.9 7
The court, however, did not even consider Illinois law that might have provided some guidance. It also disregarded cited cases from other jurisdictions.
Having identified what it considered a complete gap in the case law,
the court proceeded to fill it. The court looked to principles that were
highly abstract: "the underlying objectives of tort liability." Based on a
general reference to "how the Illinois courts might decide the present case,"
it identified these objectives as "compensation" and "deterrence." 98 It then
reviewed a long list of facts. Few of these facts would have been relevant
to a straightforward application of the adverse-interest rule.
Looking first at "compensation," the court considered who would
benefit from recovery by Cenco. The court did not articulate a point to the
compensation analysis. Nor did it look to case law for any recognized
F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Once a court accepts this contributory-negligence
principle (that plaintiff cannot recover when negligent) in audit cases, it follows that, in the
context of the imputation rule, a negligent corporation cannot recover even where an auditor
was negligent. This principle indicates that the corporation cannot evade a contributorynegligence defense by pointing to the duty of the auditor. The very point of the imputation
rule is to provide a defense to an actor who was negligent. The contributory-negligence rule
lets the company off the hook only if the agent's conduct was entirely adverse to the company; the law treats this as a proxy (in my view, a poor one) for non-negligence by the company.
95.
For example, a then-recent case from the Southern District of New York had
addressed the question whether "the knowledge and conduct of [company management]
must be legally imputed to [the company], so that [the company] will be deemed to have
known of all the alleged indiscretions of its inside management." In re Investors' Funding,
523 F. Supp. at 540-41.
96.
Not surprisingly, they disagreed about whether there was authority that was
directly controlling. Seidman insisted there was and Cenco that there was not. Both parties,
however, insisted that the answer lay in the legal rules and the case law arguably applicable
to the question. See Br. of Appellant Cenco Inc. at 27, 30 ("This appeal presents a question
of law never previously confronted by an American court" although there was "one squarely
applicable common law decision" from England in 1887; going on to discuss analogous case
law) and the Br. of Appellee Seidman & Seidman at 26 ("many courts have dealt with the
subject"). Briefs are on file with the author.
97.
See Br. of Appellant Cenco Inc. at 40-44; Br. of Appellee Seidman & Seidman
at 25-40 (on file with author). For discussion of audit-related case law, see Cenco brief at
31-44, and Br. of Appellee Seidman & Seidman at 25-40.
98.
Cenco, 686 F.2d at 455.
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"right" to compensation. Instead it considered the fairness, in a rough-andready sense, of various possible outcomes. In doing so, it ignored the corporate form and
directly considered the compensation effect on Cenco's
99
shareholders.

Based on this review, the court concluded that compensation considerations pointed away from permitting shareholders to collect from the
auditor. "Because of shareholder turnover there is always a potential mismatch between the recovery of damages by a corporation and the compensation of the shareholders actually injured by the wrong."'1'0 This case, the
court concluded, was "a more dramatic mismatch ...than usual."''1

1

The court then turned to deterrence. Still without citing authority, it
identified several facts as relevant. The court stated that, as a general matter, "in a publicly held corporation such as Cenco most shareholders do not
have a large enough stake to want to apply an active role in hiring and supervising managers."10 2 On the other hand, it continued, permitting a publicly held company to avoid the cost of its own officers' fraud would reduce
shareholder "incentives to hire honest managers and monitor their behavior." 10 3 As in every large company, "the shareholders [had] delegate[d] this4

role to a board of directors, which in this case failed in its responsibility."' 0
This cut in favor of imputation, thus preventing Cenco Incorporated from

99.
See id. The court divided those shareholders into three groups. The first was
"people who bought stock in Cenco before the fraud began," a group that contained "the
corrupt officers themselves" as well as other stockholders who played no direct role in the
fraud. Id. The second group was "people who bought during the fraud period," comprising
those who already had "sold at a loss" and those who continued to hold their shares, also "at
a loss." Id. The final group was "shareholders who [had] bought after the fraud was unmasked." Id. Members of the first group, the court reasoned, did not deserve compensation
because they were wrongdoers themselves or were those who had "elected the board of
directors that managed Cenco during the fraud." Id. Members of the second group did not
deserve compensation either, at least from the auditor. Id. The reasons were somewhat
complicated. In particular, these shareholders already had brought their own direct claims
against both Cenco and Seidman & Seidman, and had received compensation from both.
The court stated that they had received $3.5 million from Seidman and $11 million from
Cenco. Id. at 451, 459. Thus the court took into account the size of the judgment relative to
total debt of the company (so it could determine whether shareholders would benefit from
the claim), as well as the outcome of other litigation. See id. Again, none of this was previously found in imputation law. As to the third group, the court reasoned that its members
deserved no compensation at all, because they had purchased their Cenco stock after the
fraud had come to light and the share price had fallen. Id. at 455 (the court did not consider
the fact that these shareholders might have paid more for their stock in order to acquire
Cenco's claims against the auditor).
100.
Cenco, 686 F.2d. at 455.
101.
Id.
102.
Id. at 455-56.
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
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"shift[ing] the entire cost of the fraud from itself.. to the independent
auditor who failed to detect the fraud."' 0 5
The court also noted that this fraud was unusually pervasive and complex. "Inaddition, the scale of the fraud - the number and high rank of the
managers involved - both complicated the task of discovery for Seidman
and makes the failure of oversight by Cenco's shareholders and board of
directors harder to condone." 1°6
After completing its analysis of the "underlying objectives of tort liability,"' 7 the court turned back to precedent. In effect applying the adverse-interest rule, it stated that the fraud would be imputed to the corporation if fraud had "benefited" the corporation, and would not be imputed if it
had "harmed" the corporation.10 8 It noted that, in this case, the officers had
"conmit[ted] fraud for the benefit of the corporation," so its shareholders
should bear responsibility.109
One might argue that Cenco is not pragmatist because it acknowledges
the authority of squarely controlling law, as any United States Court of Appeals must do. But this argument ignores the set of reasoning techniques
that, taken together, bear a strong and unmistakably pragmatist family resemblance. The court looked past clearly established rules that could have
resolved the case, even if by close analogy rather than formal syllogism.
Instead, it engaged in a wide-ranging analysis that moved swiftly to first
principles of tort law and then to a slew of general and specific factual assertions, and did so without looking again at the legal status of the inputs it
chose. The analysis involved numerous additional facts and normative
judgments. Taken together, these elements amount to as pragmatic a decision as one is likely to find issued by any court.
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CENCO COURT'S PRAGMATIST REASONING

Contextuality/getting the
right answer all things
considered

Form/principle

Pragmatism/policy

Apply the adverseinterest rule, and
address facts that the
rule considers rele-

Identify abstract "objectives" of tort law in
general, then select
facts relevant to those

105.
Id. at 455.
106.
Cenco, 686 F.2d. at 456.
107.
Id. at 455.
108.
Id at 456. The court then interpreted "benefit" to turn on the intent of the
wrongdoers. Id.
109.
Id.
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vant.

objectives.

True judicial errors

Lower probability of
error, because of
fewer (and simpler)
empirical assertions
and less complex
reasoning.

Higher probability of
error, because of more
empirical assertions
and more complex reasoning.

Decision costs

Requires only the
application of the
adverse-interest rule.
This leads to the
same outcome the
court reached
through its more
complex reasoning.

The court considered a
much larger set of facts.
This required the court
to determine it had an
empirical basis for each
fact, and to conduct
more complex reasoning.

Continuity and Predictability

Higher. Actors can
depend on application of adverseinterest rule.

Lower. This is illustrated by subsequent
cases.

Justification of the judicial role

Rests more easily on
conventional justifications for the judicial role.

Needs a new justification for empowering
the court to select abstract "objectives," then
make the normative and
empirical assertions
involved in the opinion.

B.

THE TRADE-OFFS PRESENTED BY PRAGMATIST REASONING

1.

Blunt versus contextual reasoning: Trying to reach better decisions
all-things-considered

The move from more form-oriented to more pragmatic decisionmaking involves a series of trade-offs. The benefit side of the trade-off
should be an improvement in legal reasoning. This is achieved, pragmatists
hope, by replacing form-oriented reasoning, which can be a blunt instru-
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ment, with all-things considered reasoning, which can be more sensitive to
context.
The question of sensitivity to context immediately points us to a conceptual gap in pragmatism. To evaluate how closely a decision's reasoning
fits a specific context, we need a substantive norm to give meaning to "context."" 0 A judge cannot, of course, take literally every fact of a dispute into
account. Description presupposes evaluation, and evaluation presupposes
some criterion. Therefore, identifying which facts are relevant - the facts to
which the pragmatist judge wishes to be sensitive - requires "some principle of selection.""' Pragmatism does not provide this principle.1 2 Perhaps
pragmatists would plug this gap with an appeal to reasonableness, or to a
specific external theory, but so far they have not done so. 1 3 Until pragmatism resolves this problem, it cannot fully advance its central goal of situated, context-sensitive decision-making.
We can, however, put aside the emptiness of the word "context" and
observe pragmatism's effect on the texture of legal reasoning. In particular,
we can observe whether, compared with conventional reasoning, a pragmatist tends more to refined, case-specific facts and reasoning and less to
coarser, more generalized facts and reasoning. This will give us a sense of
whether pragmatism does, in fact, reduce the number of errors of imperfect
fit. We also can observe whether pragmatism delivers an improvement in
empirical grounding.
A review of Cenco suggests that pragmatism does not produce reasoning that is significantly less general, nor does it necessarily result in improved empirical grounding. Because of the absence of a standard for context-sensitivity, the best that we can do here is observe the style of the
court's reasoning. In particular, we can observe whether the court considered additional facts that would have been suppressed by the adverseinterest rule, and whether, in some sense, the court's pragmatism gave its
assertions a stronger empirical grounding.
This is a variation of the argument, much discussed in the literature, that prag110.
matism is contentless and must import its content from other theories. For short statements
of this argument and a pragmatist response see Richard Epstein, The Perils of Posnerian
Pragmatism, 71 U. CI. L. REv. 639, 640-51 (2004) (setting out the criticism), and the response from Richard Posner, Legal Pragmatism Defended, 71 U. CI. L. REv. 683, 683
(2004) (calling the argument that pragmatism is "contentless" a "standard charge").
See an explanation of this point in FINNIS, supra note 9, at 4. Finnis explains
111.
the dependence of description on evaluation. Id. at 3-4, 16-17.
112.
This point is not original. For example, Schauer makes this point in PLAYING
BY THE RuLES, supra note 8, at 86-87.
113.
In the view of pragmatist writers, the concept of "reasonableness" gives pragmatism sufficient content. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Legal Pragmatism Defended, 71 U.
Ci. L. REv. 683, 693 (2004).
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Pragmatic "objectives" are more general than formal rules. The
Cenco court's first step was toward, not away from, abstraction. The court
decided there was no Illinois case precisely on point, and it chose not to
draw on abundant and closely neighboring case law. Instead it invoked the
"underlying objectives" of tort law as a whole. 1 4 These "objectives" are
highly abstract. This approach therefore contrasts with the form-oriented
reasoning that the Cenco court chose to forego. Formal reasons available to
the court included the adverse-interest rule, which is less abstract than
"compensation" and "deterrence," and reported cases which apply that rule
to specific contexts. This shows that form-oriented reasoning can be less
abstract than a pragmatic appeal to fundamental principles. It also can be
incremental, because it tends toward resolving disputes through application
of the nearest precedents. Through this attention to precedent, including the
creation of new precedents through the use of analogy, the more formoriented reasoning tethers decision-making to a relatively low level of generality.
Pragmatism lacks the channeling and structuringfunction of rules.
By contrast, pragmatism does little to structure, channel or otherwise constrain judicial reasoning. It provides no guide to the level of generality at
which the court should address a problem,' 1 5 and it frees the pragmatist
judge to jump directly to a high level of abstraction. Like the type of philosopher whose usefulness pragmatists tend to reject, the pragmatist can be
quick (quicker than the common-law
judge) to employ highly abstract con6
cepts to decide concrete cases. 1
Cenco considers facts beyond those relevant to the adverse-interest
rule. On the other hand, this freedom from formal constraints enabled the
Cenco court to consider a number of facts beyond those needed to apply the
adverse-interest rule. This creates an initial impression of increased factspecificity. For example, the court drew on three different considerations
(compensation, deterrence, and whether the agent conduct was adverse to
the principal) rather than one, permitting more sensitivity to context than
straight application of the adverse-interest rule. This approach gave the
114.
686 F.2d at 455.
115.
This puts aside the contentlessness of the word "context."
116.
The court's reference to the fundamentals of tort law as the source for its norms
indicates, not pragmatism's connection with existing law, but the opposite. Such a generalized reference to tort law does little to limit the norms available to the court. By most accounts, the foundations of tort law contain a rich conceptual storehouse. Although the
Cenco court looked there and saw an instrumentalist, largely economic view of tort law (the
view with which Posner is famously associated, see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW CH. 6 ("TORT LAW") (5TH ED. 1998)), the court just as easily could have
looked there and found other concepts. Some more conspicuous examples include combinations of corrective justice, duty and fault, risks and harms, even rights and causation.
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court some flexibility and freed it to articulate a decision that addressed
relevant underlying goals.
On closer look, however, the effect on generality is mixed. The court
did, in effect, restate the adverse-interest rule to a lower level of generality:
from an articulation that applied to all principal-agent relationships to one
that applied only where the principals are public corporations. But the discussion remained quite general. It remained dependent on statements that
are applicable to whole classes of cases - on generalizations about large
corporations - rather than on the specifics of this case. This continued use
of generality apparently made it difficult to advance the related goal of improved empirical grounding. The court simply did not identify empirical
support for a number of its generalizations.
An example is the analysis of compensation. It rests on division of the
shareholders into three groups, a division that is present in every large public company. 17 Also true of every large public company is the assertion
that the wrongdoer shareholders might benefit if shareholders as a group
were permitted to recover from the auditor. 1 8 The court did not consider
facts specific to this set of wrongdoers, such as the amount of their recovery
netted against their liability for any claims against them based on the
fraud.119
There are other examples as well, such as the court's statements that
certain Cenco shareholders already had recovered damages from the auditor
and from the company itself. Although the court noted these facts, it did
not fit them into its analysis. 120 Nothing in the record indicated that the
recoveries from other litigation gave these shareholders full compensation
for their losses, much less that additional compensation in the case at hand
would overcompensate them. The court itself acknowledged that it was
making an unsupported assumption: "This is not to say they would be overcompensated."' '2 The record simply does not contain this fact.
Achieving deterrence depends on generalization. The court's discussion of deterrence is similarly general. The court asserted that, as a general
matter, deterrence is served by holding public company shareholders and
Id. at 455.
117.
Id.
118.
To determine whether the assertion is correct, one must know whether the
119.
wrongdoers were required to pay out any benefit they received through litigation relating to
the fraud. The corporation has claims against the wrongdoers based on that wrongdoing, and
almost certainly the wrongdoers can be forced to forfeit any gain from their wrongdoing, at
least to the extent the wrongdoing injured the company. The wrongdoers can be sued by the
company, possibly its shareholders, and other victims of the fraud. On this record, however,
it is not known whether the shareholders - or Cenco Incorporated - prevailed on such
claims. Cenco, 686 F.3d at 451-52.
686 F.2d at 455.
120.
Id.
121.
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directors responsible for losses caused by employee fraud, at least when the
fraud "caused widespread harm to outsiders."' 122 As the court explained, "if
the owners of the corrupt enterprise are allowed to shift the costs of its
wrongdoing entirely to the auditor, their incentives to hire honest managers
and monitor their behavior will be reduced."' 123 This is an empirical assertion, and a highly contested one as well: Shareholder plaintiffs asserting
claims against auditors certainly would respond that it is more effective to
hold auditors responsible for detecting fraud. 124 Yet the court cited no empirical support for its assertion. 125 The context-sensitive answer arguably
requires more details about the fraud to shed light on which party could
have better prevented it in this case.
Increasing the context-sensitivity of the deterrence discussion would,
however, point to a different challenge for pragmatism. By its nature, deterrence depends on generalization. It is not clear, therefore, how a pragmatist would increase context-sensitivity in a case where the goal is deterrence. It seems, however, that the type of generalization employed in
Cenco is a weak basis for deterrence. These generalizations were not cast
into the form of a new rule, and therefore could not provide the deterrence
benefits of generalizations found in more formal reasoning.
Cenco shows that courts generalizefor other reasonsas well Cenco's
dependence on generalization indicates that the influence of legal form is
not the only reason courts abstract away from the specific facts and consequences of the case at hand. Another reason is simple human limitations.
Cenco suggests that, even when judges are freed from the constraints of
legal form, practical considerations still cause them to use decision-making
heuristics or rules of thumb, and these techniques tend to approximate the
generalizations that pragmatists wanted to avoid in the first place. The per122.
Id. at 455-56.
123.
Id. at 455.
124.
For an example of this argument, see Note, Tightening Gatekeeper Liability:
Should Officers and Directors' Wrongdoing Be Imputed to the Corporationin Suits Against
Third-Party Professionals?, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1883, 1903-11, 1916-17 (1996). See also
Note, Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman: A Futile Attempt to Deter Management Fraud,
1984 DUKE L.J. 141, 148-52 (arguing that "[e]xpecting passive shareholders to monitor
corporate managers to the extent necessary to uncover management fraud is unrealistic").
For a discussion of the possible deterrence effects of various liability schemes for auditors,
see John A. Siciliano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86
MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1960-67 (1988). For an argument that the current state of the law generally provides insufficient incentives for auditors to perform their duties with an optimal
level of diligence, see Patricia A. McCoy, Realigning Auditors' Incentives, 35 CoNN. L.
REv. 989, 991-1005 (2003).
125.
For an example of an empirical approach to the deterrent effect of gatekeeper
liability under the federal securities laws, see Barbara Ann Banoff, Gatekeeper Liability
Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933: So Why Isn't The Grass Growing In Wall
Street?, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 267, 270 (2003).
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sistence of these techniques in this pragmatist opinion suggests the existence of practical limits on the ability of any court to engage in particularistic, situated decision-making.
These techniques appear to be responses to the high costs of information, and therefore can be understood as efforts to reduce decision costs.
This establishes a link between the persistence of decision costs in any
judging exercise and the limited ability of judges to engage in contextual
judging. The incentive to employ these techniques probably is increased by
pragmatism's appetite for facts, and by the complex reasoning that these
numerous facts require. This further suggests that pragmatism's appetite
for facts cuts against its goal of particularized reasoning. It also suggests
that scholars may overstate the ability of pragmatic judging to achieve particularized decision-making.
Cenco appears to assume a material degree of legal coherence. In
fact, addressing existing law at this abstract level runs counter to the very
spirit of pragmatism. The contention that a court can identify unifying fundamental principles of "tort law" assumes a significant degree of coherence
across the law. (Even if one chooses to reject the existence of legal concepts, as pragmatists do, this approach still assumes that simple fundamental principles exist that make sense of all of tort law.) This assumption is
inconsistent with pragmatism's emphasis on increased contextuality. Tort
law applies to an enormous range of human conduct. It can be decidedly
technical, reflecting experiences with specific legal locales. 126 That is why
some arguments for legal formality point to rules that are rooted in specific
legal locales, reflecting the specific experience that generated the rule, and
reflecting the combination of specificity and generality that rules can reflect. 27 For a court to resolve a case based on principles that are sufficiently general to fit all of tort law, it must ignore the concepts that the law
has developed for the context of the specific activity at issue. This seems
the antithesis of the pragmatist spirit.

126.
Joseph Raz makes this point in The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REv.
273, 293-95 (1992). See also, JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALrrY OF FREEDOM, rT. 1 (1986) for his
discussion of the authority of law
127.
See, e.g., Justice Scalia's argument for applying a rule at "the most specific
level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can
be identified," and identifying a rule "specifically relating to the rights of an adulterous
natural father." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (discussed in Sullivan, supra note 22, at 77). But see, Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Ci. L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1990) (disagreeing with
Justice Scalia's assertion that this constitutes a value-neutral means of selecting a level of
generality).
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The rate of truejudicial errors

The conclusion that pragmatism delivers less benefit than expected
brings us to pragmatism's costs. One is the increased opportunity for true
judicial errors. These are errors that involve a mistake by a judge rather
than the bluntness of a legal rule. True errors occur when a judge gets the
case wrong in this sense: by failing to reach the optimal outcome, measured
in terms of the relevant background justification, where the
judge would
28
have gotten it right by simply applying a relevant legal rule. 1
Pragmatist judging increases the probability of true errors in at least
two related ways. The risk of empirical error increases both because the
court has to address a greater number of facts and because the nature of
29
some of the additional facts may strain the court's fact-finding ability.
Pragmatic judging also increases the risk of reasoning error, because it requires more complex reasoning to fit the greater number of facts
and the
30
court-selected norms into a coherent justification for a decision.,
This increased risk of true error cuts against pragmatism's own goals
of improved substantive outcomes. The true errors in finding facts specifically cut against the goal of empirically sounder decisions. It is hard to
generalize about this trade-off in the abstract, but the review of Cenco v.
Seidman & Seidman gives us a sense that the increased probability of true
error is far from trivial.
The starting point is that the Cenco court could have resolved the case
by applying the adverse-interest rule. Applying a rule would have increased the incidence of error due to imperfect fit: that the language of the
rule, applied to the facts of the case, might have led to a result that did not
advance the rule's purpose. The court in Cenco did not address the possibility of this kind of error. Nonetheless, it chose not to limit itself to the

128.
See PLAYING BY THE RuLEs, supra note 8, at 149-57 (discussing decision-maker
error). A somewhat similar kind of error does exist in a rule-making regime, in that a judge
might simply make a mistake in applying the rule. Because rule-based reasoning tends to be
less complex than all-things-considered judging, however, the incidence of such errors
should be lower. This kind of error does not arise if one accepts the legal realist contention
that there is no such thing as the straightforward application of a rule because of the substantial opportunity for manipulation in even the simplest decision. Pragmatists contend that
rules should not constrain, but it is not clear whether they contend that rules can constrain.
Id.
129.
For the discussion of the limitations of judges as generalists by another member
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, see Frank H. Easterbrook,
What's So Special About Judges, 61 U. CoLo. L. REv. 773, 779-80 (1990).
130.
This puts aside, of course, the possibility that the pragmatist judge chooses a
norm entirely external to the legal rule. In such a case, the judge can commit error by reaching a decision that does not advance that norm.
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factors recognized by the rule. It addressed a considerably larger set of
facts, and more complex ones, than the adverse-interest rule considered.
In exchange for this freedom from the rule, however, the court accepted a higher probability of true judicial error. First, the risk of empirical
error increased both because the court had to address a greater number of
facts and because the nature of some of the additional facts strained the
court's fact-finding ability. For example, Cenco contains assertions about
the incentives created by different possible liability schemes.' 3' Yet Posner
himself, in his scholarship, has expressed skepticism about the ability of
judges to find facts very much like these, including "how markets work, the
incentives that particular transactions create ... and the deterrent effects of
different punishments."'' 32 For these kinds of facts, Posner wrote, judges
"often ... fall back on hunch, intuition, and personal experiences that may
be misleading." 133 This tendency confirms the increased risk of true judicial error, especially for the ordinary judge. While Cenco was authored by
Judge Posner, whom even an adversary described as "the wonder of the
legal world,"' 134 most decisions are made by more ordinary judges. And
even in Cenco we do not find an articulated basis for these factual assertions. The increased risk of empirical error appears to be another way that
pragmatism's practical demands - here, for more facts - undercut pragmatism's goals - here, for decisions with better grounding in the real world.
Second, Cenco's pragmatist approach also increased the risk of reasoning error. It required the court to select norms, then to identify some
appropriate mix of those norms, and to conduct those steps without even the
guidance of analogous case law. The court's selection of multiple normative goals (compensation, deterrence, and adverse-interest factors) required
reasoning that was geometrically more complex than that required to apply
the adverse-interest rule. For example, Cenco attempted to identify some
optimal combination of compensation and deterrence, as those goals applied to this case. This required separate analyses of the compensation and
deterrence effects of possible decisions, followed by consideration of the
optimal combination of the two effects, as applied to this case. On some
theories, compensation and deterrence are incommensurable goals, in that
they cannot be quantified and totaled up on a single scale. They might even
point to opposite conclusions. To give a full account of its reasoning, a
131.
686 F.2d at 455-56.
132.
LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 75-76. Similarly, Posner
wrote in THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE that judges "obtain much of their knowledge of
how the world works from materials that are systematically unreliable sources of information." PROBLEMS, supra note 36, at 211.
133.
LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 75-76.
134.
Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy and Monica Lewinsky, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 48, 48
(Mar. 9, 2000).
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court would have had to explain each objective, articulate how a decision
would advance or hinder each, articulate the relationship between the two
objectives, and explain its choice of the most desirable mix. 135 The court
also would have had to reconcile its compensation/deterrence analysis with
its inquiry
into whether the fraud was intended to help or harm the com136
pany.
In sum, the incidence of true errors probably would increase under a
pragmatist regime because each judge, working without the formal guid137
ance of existing law, must construct an opinion virtually from scratch.
What Judge Posner called a "clean slate" can be equally portrayed as trackless terrain, which the judge must negotiate without the conventional legal
signposts of lines of authority, doctrinal stops, and factual analogy. This
increase in true errors raises the question of whether the trade-offs chosen
by pragmatism - trying to reduce the bluntness of more formal reasoning by
accepting additional true judicial errors - was warranted.
3.

Decision costs

A commonly-noted benefit of formality in reasoning is reduced decision costs. Formality fosters this reduction by "remov[ing] factors from
consideration," 138 enabling judges to decide "cases on the basis of a comparatively small number of easily identified factors."' 139 This frees the judge
from having to "examine[] every facet of the [case] with140the same degree of
care he would have employed had there been no rules."'
As judging shifts down the continuum from higher to lower formality,
decisions become more expensive. Formality is absent from pragmatism's
all-things-considered approach, which declines to remove any factors from

135.
This is similar to the application of a balancing test, though a very open-ended
one because its components are stated at a very high level of generality. The balancing test
is another point where the reasoning methods of pragmatism can overlap with those of traditional judging. For a detailed discussion of balancing tests, see, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in an Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943 (1987) (describing
balancing as assigning values to specific interests at stake and giving each interest its due in
the result); see also id. at 958-65 (placing balancing tests in the context of the growth of
pragmatic adjudication).
136.
686 F.2d at 455.
137.
Whether or not the pragmatist judge writes an opinion that expressly addresses
all possibly relevant considerations (something courts rarely do), that judge still must conduct the mental exercise of averting to every such consideration and understanding its relationship to the decision.
138.
PLAYING BY THE RuLEs, supra note 8, at 146.
139.
Id. at 147.
140.
Id. at 146.
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consideration. (Again, pragmatism
is more extreme in this respect than
141
standard-based reasoning.)
Here it is helpful to consider the two dimensions by which some writers describe judicial decisions.142 One dimension is "depth," which refers
to the extent to which a judicial opinion moves from concrete facts to
higher levels of abstraction in order to build a theoretical justification for a
decision. The other is "breadth," which is the familiar reference to the degree to which an opinion uses language that is narrow, and thus decides
only the 43case at hand, or is broad, and therefore encompasses future cases
1
as well.
This vocabulary helps us identify the effect of the levels of formality
on the texture of judicial reasoning, and in turn on the levels of decision
costs. Higher adjudicative formality appears to correlate with shallower
decisions, while lower adjudicative formality requires deeper ones. Shallower decisions have a variety of implications. We expect them to be less
tailored to context, but we also expect them to be cheaper. This takes us
back to the concern that motivates pragmatism: If judges make decisions
that are shallower in the sense that they consist of more formal application
of existing legal materials, the judges are less likely to consider the particulars of each case. By contrast, pragmatists contend, a pragmatist decision
will better resolve the instant case by considering more facts and justifying
its outcome in terms of those specific facts. Such decisions are deeper, and
will tend to revisit theoretical foundations much more often. As a result,
they are more costly.
The dimension of breadth is harder to assess in the context of pragma144
tism, because breadth assumes that a decision carries force across time.
Decisions in a pragmatist system carry much-diminished force across time,
so that the additional work the pragmatist judge does to construct deeplytheorized opinions provides reduced payoff in the future. The next court

141.
Judge Posner is well aware that this kind of decision-making is more costly, but
he does not address the magnitude, and all of the causes, of the increase. See, e.g. PROBLEMS,
supra note 36, at 45. See also Thomas, supra note 2, at 153.
142.
These two dimensions have been thoroughly developed by Cass Sunstein. See,
e.g., ONE CASE, supra note 29. See generally Frederick Schauer, Justice Stevens and the
Size of ConstitutionalDecisions, 27 Rutgers L. J. 543 (1996).
143.
ONE CASE, supra note 29, at 42.
144.
We can generalize about pragmatist decisions, which we would expect to be
extremely narrow. It is, however, difficult to generalize about decisions that reflect a regard
for legal form, as they can be broad or narrow. Sunstein expects more formal decisions to be
narrower, see ONE CASE, supra note 29, at 70, although advocates of a stronger regard for
form, such as Justice Antonin Scalia, would contend that broader decisions are just as likely
and better serve underlying commitments to the rule of law. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of
Law As The Law Of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
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must incur the same costs - which already are higher because of pragmatism - all over again.
Pragmatists are, of course, aware that legal rules simplify decisionmaking and "economize on judges' time."1 45 In effect, this is another tradeoff that pragmatists strike differently from conventional judges. Pragmatists believe that the increase in decision costs is worth it, because the very
means by which rules reduce decision costs is by preventing judges from
considering facts that could lead to the best substantive decision in each
case.
Cenco gives us a sense of the magnitude of this increase. The Cenco
court considered a much wider range of facts than would have been needed
to apply the adverse-interest rule. Even though the court relied on heuristics for a number of these facts, its approach still required it to craft an
opinion of considerable depth, starting at the foundations of tort law. The
opinion would have been even more complex had the court fully undertaken the task of articulating the relationship among compensation, deterrence and adverse-interest considerations.
We might expect that "a deep account will in all likelihood have applications to cases other than the ones before the [c]ourt,"' 14 6 but that is not the
case for pragmatist decisions. To the extent that later courts share Cenco's
pragmatist view of precedent, the opinion will not resolve future cases. To
the contrary, it will multiply future costs. Not only will it widen the scope
of lawsuits, it will extend their lives, because it will decrease the frequency
of disposition on motions and the possibility of settlement. 147 The result
can be the worst of both worlds: on the one hand, the generality and suboptimality found in a system of a higher level of formality, and on the other,
the higher decision costs found in a system with little legal formality.
4.

Predictabilityand continuity

1 48
The correlation between form and predictability also is familiar.
The higher the level of form in a legal system, the more the judging process
tends to be replicable by practicing lawyers, and the better judicial deci-

145.
PROBLEMS, supra note 36, at 53.
146.
ONE CASE, supra note 29, at 18. See also id. at 17 (noting the possibility of
cases that are deep but narrow).
147.
This is borne out by subsequent case law. Cases that cite Cenco as a source of a
verbal rule (applying the adverse-interest rule to corporate frauds) do not display the complexity of pragmatist reasoning, while cases that adopt Cenco's pragmatist style display the
same pragmatist features discussed here. See discussion infra part III.B.4.
148.
Posner acknowledges that rules tend to facilitate planning more than standards,
which reflect a lower degree of formality. See PROBLEMS, supra note 36, at 50; see also
PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 8, at 137-45.
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sions tend to match the expectations of ordinary citizens. 49 A higher level
of formality serves the practical end of reducing the costs of identifying and
complying with the law. 150 It also enhances citizen autonomy
and, for this
51
reason, generally is treated as a value in its own right.'
It is a given that a reduction in form causes a reduction in predictability. Because pragmatism rejects formal reasons altogether, this reduction
can be substantial. By eliminating the force of precedent, pragmatism
leaves more elements of decision-making open for reconsideration in every
case. Its emphasis on factual specificity reduces the extent to which any
case provides a basis for generalizing about future cases. Here again,
pragmatism tries to strike a different balance of legal virtues from conventional judging. It chooses to decrease predictability and doctrinal continuity
52
in an effort to increase the probability of getting each decision just right. 1
It may seem obvious that pragmatism decreases predictability, but
leading pragmatists dispute the point. They contend that pragmatism can
address predictability concerns, and do so in just the right amount, by respecting precedent to the degree required for optimal predictability. 153 This
contention is reflected in the "systemic" concerns to which Posner would
give "due regard," 154 and in Farber's view that pragmatists can "look

149.
It is fundamental that the brighter a legal line, the better it gives notice to those
whom the law expects to conform their conduct based on that line. The brighter line also
avoids chilling conduct that is close to the border but still socially desirable. On the substantial costs of legal uncertainty, see John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance With Legal Costs, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965 (1984) (discussing
"some ways in which uncertainty about the application of legal standards can give parties
economic incentives to 'overcomply' or 'undercomply"').
150.
The benefits of predictability and doctrinal stability may vary with context;
some spheres of activity involve planning based on existing legal doctrines more than others.
The United States Supreme Court made a variation of this point when it rejected a test for
attorney-client privilege that contains multiple variables, stating that, "if the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with
some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by
the courts, is little better than no privilege at all." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 393 (1981).
151.
A conspicuous example of this view is the expression of the value, as goods in
themselves, of stability and continuity in the opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and
Souter in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-64 (1992).
152.
At least some pragmatist writers acknowledge the value of continuity with the
past, but they assign it low weight. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 38, at 1344-46.
153.
According to Posner, precedents "are the materials on which the community
necessarily places its principal reliance in trying to figure out what the 'law' is, that is, what
judges will do with a legal dispute if it arises." LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra
note 2, at 63.
154.
Id. at 61.
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back" in just the right amount.' 55 This is critical to a defense of pragmatism,
because it suggests that pragmatists can disregard formal reasons without
any corresponding cost.
This contention, however, seems wrong. First, it appears impracticable. A pragmatist scheme cannot reject the existence of a duty to respect
precedent, then make selective exceptions-respecting precedent-when
doing so appears warranted to advance predictability. This suggestion simply pushes the problem back one step. Citizens have no way to know if
they can have reasonable expectations-to know when they can "place
principal reliance" on existing legal "materials"-unless the legal system
tells them so. And the legal system can tell them so only by acknowledging
a judicial obligation to give special force to precedent. This is, in fact, the
familiar objection to the predictivist theory of law. Judges cannot predict
how they themselves will decide cases.
Second, even if pragmatism could achieve predictability in this way, it
still would not capture predictability's traditional significance. Pragmatists
relegate predictability to purely utilitarian status, again reflecting their
adoption of the predictivist view of law. 156 This misses predictability's
normative dimension. 157 Traditionally, predictability and continuity have
been considered important in their own right, mostly because of a connection with autonomy, individual agency and similar foundational concepts of
liberal thought. That is why predictability is among the values associated
with the rule of law. 158
Cenco illustrates the tension between pragmatism and predictability.
Under the adverse-interest rule, the affected parties-auditors, corporations,
shareholders, and creditors-know that the corporation bears responsibility
for the fraud, with the exception of cases in which the fraud is wholly
against the corporation. This exception group is reasonably identifiable in
156.
In this respect, pragmatism is another variation of Holmes's prediction theory of
law. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,458-61

(1897). Like pragmatism, that theory was vulnerable to the criticism that it failed to account
for the normative basis for legal prediction.
157.
This argument lends support to Ronald Dworkin's criticism that pragmatism
inaccurately describes judicial opinions as "pretending" that legal concepts have force, what

Dworkin labels an "as-if' strategy. LAW'S EMpIw, supra note 67, at 154-55. On this reading, pragmatism treats law as a kind of Myth of Ur.
158.
Another often-claimed benefit of rule-oriented judging is enhanced fairness
across cases. Pragmatists would dispute this claim, contending that, to the extent that rules
lead to second-best substantive decisions, they cause judges to treat like cases differently.
Therefore, the pragmatist argument goes, it is more particularistic reasoning that advances
fairness, because it can take into account the relevant likenesses and differences between
cases. This argument runs into the debate about whether pragmatism has any content. The
pragmatist argument has force only if the particularist decisionmaker has a standard against
which to determine whether cases are alike.
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advance, likely comprising embezzlements by lower-level employees and
therefore cases with smaller damages figures. 5 9 Under Cenco, however,
the complexity of the analysis makes it impossible to predict whether a
fraud by corporation employees will be imputed to the corporation. As a
result, the company's officers and shareholders do not know what balance
to strike between performing their own monitoring and relying on the thirdparty professionals. The third-party professionals do not know what level
of resources to expend on attempting to detect fraud.
This is particularly problematic for the Cenco decision, because one of
Cenco's main goals is advancing deterrence. 60 Indeed, Cenco identifies
deterrence as one of two fundamental principles that lie at the heart of tort
law.1 6' By its nature, deterrence depends on predictability, and predictability depends on generalizations cast in a form that has force in future
cases. 62 But Cenco's pragmatism virtually eliminates any identifiable effect on planning and conduct. Nor did Cenco advance deterrence through
the generalizations that it employed in its review of relevant facts. Because
these generalizations have no legal force in future cases,1 63 it is doubtful
that they could have any deterrent effect.
Pragmatist decision making further undermines predictability because
of the increase it causes in true judicial errors. These true errors undermine
predictability in a way that errors of imperfect fit - the kind of error that is
more likely in a form-oriented regime - do not. One of the very reasons
that the rule-oriented regime accepts imperfect fit is to purchase predictability, because the existence of the generalized rule helps people to know the
law in advance. True judicial errors cannot have the same effect on plan-

159.
Whether fraud is adverse to the company is irrelevant to the auditor, whether as
a matter of deterrence or in terms of the auditor's culpability. Nonetheless, it is possible that
the adverse-interest rule would have some deterrent effect if it were applied as a rule that
generates predictable outcomes. In that case, it would give the parties a basis from which to
bargain and therefore to assign responsibility at the outset of their relationship.
160.
See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1982).
161.
See id.
162.
For an illustration of the presumed connection between deterrence and generality, see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563, 571-72 (2005), and id. at 621-22 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
163.
In the vocabulary suggested by Frederick Schauer, generalities that are expressed with a high level of formality are "entrenched." PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note
8, at 38-111. In the rule-oriented regime, with its respect for pedigree, an existing generalization applies to later cases unless a good reason, recognized by the regime, exists to replace
it. By contrast, in the pragmatist regime, the next judge in the next case is free to reject the
generalization and assert a new one.
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ning, however, because we cannot predict when or where those errors will
occur, and therefore cannot account for them in planning. 164
Additional evidence of pragmatism's effect on predictability comes
from the path of imputation law since Cenco. It now is much harder than it
was a couple of decades ago to predict whether a fraud will be imputed to a
corporation. 165 Opinions that have approximated the pragmatist approach
of Cenco are relatively lengthy and complex, and frustrate efforts to predict
their outcome.' 66 That is why, as one knowledgeable scholar wrote in a
discussion of Cenco and its progeny, imputation case law "reveals little
common ground and strongly suggests the need for a more workable
framework to address imputation and adverse-interest issues. ,,167 He concluded that the decisions since Cenco "hardly provide a useful road map for
deciding future cases. What is most striking about these opinions is that,
while they often reach different results, nearly all acknowledge Cenco and
[the subsequent Seventh Circuit decision] Schacht [v. Brown], 68 as the
leading authorities.' ' 169 Although he did not suggest that the pragmatic reasoning in Cenco was a source of the uncertainty, the uncertainty in the cases
164.
In a pragmatist regime, any decision, including a wrong decision, has a reduced
effect on later cases because no case has an authority-based effect on later cases. On the
other hand, for the same reason pragmatism should reduce the costs of error in any one case.
165.
It is possible to treat Cenco non-pragmatically, as the source of an adverseinterest rule refined to address public companies. That approach does not require the lengthy
analysis conducted in Cenco or lead to the same unpredictability of outcome. See, e.g., In re
Wedtech Sec. Litig., 138 B.R. 5, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Cenco solely as an expression of
the traditional adverse-interest rule); Michael L. Rugen, The Cenco or Imputation Defenses:
Defeating the "Stop Me Before I Kill Again" Claim, in ACCOUNTANTS' LIABLMrrY 1995 at
245, 247 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 526, 1995) (addressing Cenco as providing a rule for the application of the adverse-interest rule to corporate
frauds).
166.
A prominent example is In re Jack Greenberg, Inc., 240 B.R. 486 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1999), another case addressing imputation of a management fraud in the context of
claims asserted against the auditor. The Greenberg court relied heavily on Cenco's pragmatist approach. See, e.g., 240 B.R. at 507-18. The court sometimes recast this pragmatist
approach in terms of "equity." See 240 B.R. at 502-07. The imputation analysis involved a
long list of facts and required eighteen double-columned pages of the reporter to resolve the
point. 240 B.R. at 501-18. Although it addressed the question of imputation to a trustee for
the client corporation rather than the corporation itself, Greenberg expressly and closely
followed the Cenco analysis. Id. For a case that cites Cenco and conducts an inquiry into
whether imputation would serve the objectives of tort liability, see, for example, Comeau v.
Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1127, 1141-43 (D. Kan. 1992).
167.
Matthew G. Dore, Presumed Innocent? Financial Institutions, Professional
Malpractice Claims, and Defenses Based on Management Misconduct, 1995 CoLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 127, 161-62 (1995) (taking issue with elements of the case law, but not addressing
the nature of the reasoning in the cases).
168.
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983), cited in Dore, supra note 167,
at 152 & n.96.
169.
Dore, supra note 167, at 162.
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does correspond closely with the degree to which they adopt the full Cenco
analysis. 170
5.

The allocation ofpower and the basis ofjudiciallegitimacy

Whether or not pragmatism can work in practice, it faces the question
of justification. Formal reasons are relevant here because in conventional
judging they perform the intertwined functions of legitimizing and containing judicial authority. 171 They serve a legitimizing function by maintaining
a connection between adjudication and political authority. 172 They serve a
constraining function by working to establish the boundaries of that judicial
authority.
Pragmatism upsets this scheme. By dissolving the link between adjudication and political authority, it weakens adjudication's connection with
legitimacy. 73 At the same time, it relaxes the constraints on judicial power,
eliminating a primary means for distinguishing the roles of the courts from
those of other actors. This effects a substantial increase in the power of the
courts and, in most instances, of individual judges. Power shifts from legislatures to courts. Within the courts, power shifts from higher courts to
lower courts, and from earlier courts to later courts. 174
Pragmatists are aware that pragmatist adjudication needs a new theory
of legitimacy, and they offer some possibilities. For example, Daniel Farber suggests that judicial legitimacy lies in "intemaliz[ing] . . . existing
law."'175 Farber adds, however, that this approach does not acknowledge
existing law as a "constraint," but only "as part of [the judge's] own way of
thinking."' 176 This approach does not, therefore, appear to require a connection between adjudication and existing law. In the absence of that connec170.
See, e.g., Greenberg, 240 B.R. 486.
171.
The power-allocating function of rules is a central theme of PLAYING BY THE
RULES. See, e.g., PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 8, at 98-99, 158-62.
172.
On rules as power-conferring devices, see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 26-49, 77-79, 238-40 (2d ed. 1994); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACnCAL REASON AND NORMS 97106 (1990).
173.
The nature and source of the authority of law is extensively contested. Nonetheless, virtually every account of legal authority involves at least some formal connection
between judicial decisions and previously existing law. Pragmatism, however, does not
provide that link because it does not attribute any identifiable effect to legal form.
174.
Posner contends that pragmatists include the "rational division of labor" in their
evaluation of systemic considerations. LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 2,
at 69-70. It is not clear, however, whether he refers to this in the limited sense of efficiency
or in the broader sense of the allocation of law-making power throughout a legal system.
See id.
175.
Farber, supra note 38, at 1345-46.
176.
Id. at 1345.
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tion, it cannot legitimize judicial decisions. 177 E.W. Thomas takes a different tack, focusing78 more on the flaws in the representative character of
elected officials. 1
The most extensive discussion comes, again, from Posner. He makes
no effort to connect adjudication with the usual source of legitimacy, declaring that the pragmatist "feels no need to align his judicial theory with"
traditional concepts of representative democracy. 179 Instead, he relies on
the combined effect of various political forces. 80 These include "the stick
of reprimand or impeachment" and "Congress's control over the budget,"
as well as "public opinion"18 1and even "dependence on the executive branch
to enforce its judgments."'
This theory still does not fill the legitimacy gap. These forces, without
more, cannot constrain-and therefore legitimize-adjudication. Because
the theory depends on criticism of the judge by others in the political system, it still needs a substantive standard for that criticism. That standard
must place ex ante limits on the judge's role. 82 This theory is, therefore,
vulnerable to the same criticism as the prediction account of law: that it
merely pushes the problem back one step, leaving an infinite regress that
can be stopped only with a substantive theory. Pragmatism still needs a
basis for the legitimacy of the much-expanded judicial role that it envisions.
The Cenco court gave minimal attention to the source of its authority
in this case.1 83 It concluded that there was no guiding case law that warranted even a citation. 184 The only connection it did draw between its conclusion and existing law was exceedingly slender - a lone reference to what
"Illinois courts" would do. 85 Of course, this technique increased the
court's own power relative to previous courts. It also increased the court's
power relative to the Illinois legislature, which bases decisions about
whether legislative change was necessary. The Cenco approach also sug177.
Farber's discussion of judicial legitimacy expressly responds to Ronald
Dworkin's attack on pragmatism in LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 67, at 151. See Farber, supra
note 38, at 1313, 43-44.
178.
Thomas, supra note 2, at 79-84.
179.
LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 209. Posner identifies
this traditional concept of democracy in terms he labels "Concept I democracy." Id. at 14,
106-07, 130-31, 208-09.
180.
See id. at 209.
181.
Id. at209-10.
182.
Posner's theory appears to rest legitimacy on the content of judicial decisions,
so that decisions are legitimate if these various political forces-Congress, the President,
public opinion-accept their content. Under that theory, legal form plays no role in legitimacy. This disregard for legal form leads to the various questions raised throughout this
article, and it requires a theory of legitimacy that is overtly based on content.
183.
See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982).
184.
Id. at 454-55 (citing cases only to distinguish them).
185.
Id. at 455.
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gests increased power for lower courts relative to higher courts, and for
future courts relative to earlier courts. In sum, Cenco provides evidence
supporting the view that pragmatist adjudication fits poorly with conventional, source-oriented theories of judicial legitimacy. It provides further
evidence that pragmatism needs a new theory of judicial legitimacy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A complete case for pragmatism must come to terms with the varied
and complex functions served by the formal features of legal systems. The
pragmatist argument to date is that pragmatism can provide for these functions by giving "due regard" to "systemic considerations." This argument
does not, however, acknowledge the many functions of formal reasons;
much less does it explain how pragmatism, having rejected formal reasons,
sees that these functions are taken care of. To develop this explanation, the
argument for pragmatism needs additional, and concrete, steps that address
the issues raised in this article. Pragmatism should develop the notion of
contextuality, and explain how pragmatism would improve it. It should
explain how it can improve on the bluntness of form-oriented reasoning
while accounting realistically for the practical, human limitations of judges.
Pragmatism then must explain why that improvement is worth the cost.
The costs that I have identified include an inevitable increase in true judicial errors, an increase in decision costs, and a decrease in predictability.
Pragmatism also needs to articulate a basis for the legitimacy of its distinctive conception of adjudication. In sum, if pragmatism is to be more than
an intriguing discourse, it needs to develop a response to the extensive and
complex literature that explains the functions of legal form.

